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INTRODUCTION  
The Federal Office Building bombing in Oklahoma City in April 1995 momentarily 
focused American public attention on the armed bands of indeterminate size and number 
across the United States that deemed themselves "militias," and many of which appeared 
on the Internet. Although links between those unofficial militias and the bloodiest 
terrorist attack in American history were ultimately found to be tenuous,1 their apparent 
proliferation led observers to suggest many different notional causes, including such 
paramilitary popular culture imagery as "Ramboism"; an American predisposition to 
conspiracy theory and overreaction;2 a revival of secessionism; survivalism; the linking 
of alienates on computer networks; reactions to Cold War militarization and secrecy; 
after-effects of Vietnam, including the glamorization of "special ops," and distrust of 
government arising from that war; Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair;3 gun control 
debates; 4 concern over the growth of the Federal government,5 especially its law 
enforcement elements, and the courts;6 expanding United Nations authority (which has 
contracted dramatically since);7 social tensions and frustrations,8 especially in reaction to 
rising crime;9 a new manifestation of Richard Hofstadter's hypothesis of minorities 
resorting to "paranoid style" in American politics;10 and anti-modernist nostalgia for 
simpler times and format.11 Foreign observers expressed bemusement and alarm, 
including the assertion that "the armed and angry white males of America are the 
psychopathic price to be paid for the furious energies of what remains the most 
consistently exciting and creative society on the planet."12 There was certainly enough 
rage evident in public discourse from talk radio and fundamentalist polemic to political 
rhetoric to make that understandable.  
VARYING PERSPECTIVES ON MILITIAS  
At that time, Major-General Bruce Jacobs, former editor of National Guardsman, 
hastened to point out that "Factions which now call themselves militias have interposed a 
protest movement that is essentially political in character . . .. There is no authority in the 
Constitution for creating private armies."13 That was certainly true, but unofficial 
militias and armed bands have dotted the American political landscape since the colonial 
era. The Minutemen of the Massachusetts militia became the symbol of the Revolution, 
and ultimately the National Guard citizen-soldier. The transition of colonial militias into 
those of the rebellious states, and the role they played as a seed bed of revolution for 
eight years has faded somewhat from general view, along with the fact that the 
appearance of armed insurgents, including many actual militiamen, albeit acting without 
official sanction or despite it, led to the calling of the Constitutional Convention.14 Little 
note was made of the militia, official and unofficial, in analyses of the current wave of 
unofficial militias,15 and much of the evidence of forerunners, to the extent that they are 
causally linked, lies scattered through regional history, statutes, court decisions, political 
theory, and legal and historical scholarship.16 The number of cases of armed dissidents is 
greater than generally appreciated, as the following illustrative list suggests:17  
Date/s Region Basic Events 
1642 New York Rebellion of Dutch settlers led by "Twelve" vs. governor 
1656-60 Maryland Catholic-Protestant friction, including "Civil War" 
1676 Virginia Bacon's Rebellion frontier settlers seize Jamestown seek democratic reforms and support in fighting Indians 
1676 Maryland Uprising led by William Davyes and John Pate, and Fendall's Rebellion 
1684-89 Maryland Ongoing unrest, including Coode's Rebellion 
1689 New York Leisler's Rebellion militia captain heads anti-Stuart regime 
1689 Virginia Backwoodsmen demand aid from Governor 
1750s-
60s South Carolina Rocky Mount Surveyors blocked by frontier settlers 
" North Carolina - Granville Riots against land speculators 
1750s Hudson Valley, New York First of anti-rent "wars" 
1760s New Jersey "Liberty Boys" versus county courts 
1760-




Pennsylvania "Wild Yankees" vs. proprietors 
1763-64 Central Pennsylvania 
"Paxton Boys" killed Indians and threatened to march on 
Philadelphia 




Regulators Vigilante rule in back country 
1770s Pittsburgh area 
Holders of lenient Virginia land titles resist  
Pennsylvania control and land speculators 
1770-75 East Vermont Insurgents threaten county courts 
1774-80 Western Massachusetts Berkshire Constitution 
1782 Western Massachusetts Ely's Rebellion 
1786-87 Connecticut, Massachusetts 
New England Regulation "Shays' Rebellion" Revolutionary 
War veterans and militiamen threaten legislatures, courts 
and foreclosure sales 
1794 Western Whiskey Rebellion major uprising versus Federal excise tax
Pennsylvania 
1799 Central Pennsylvania "Fries's Rebellion" vs. Federal land tax 
1830s 
on United States Armed urban gangs 
1837 New York - Canada border Hunter's Lodges support of Canadian rebels 
1839 New York - Hudson Valley 
Heidelberg War farmers vs. rent crackdown on van 
Rensselaer holdings 
1841-42 Rhode Island Dorr's War rump government leads to new constitution 
1840s New York - Hudson Valley 
Last of "Anti-rent Wars" raids and threats by "Calico 
Indians" 
1856 Kansas "Bleeding Kansas" pro and anti- slavery insurgents clash 
Mid-
1850s California Vigilante groups, San Francisco 
1857-58 Utah US Army punitive expedition stymied by Mormon militiamen 
1859 Harper's Ferry, Virginia Seizure of Federal arsenal by John Brown and abolitionists 
1867 ff. Former Confederacy Insurgent groups, e.g., Red Shirts, Ku Klux Klan 
1878 New Mexico Lincoln County War 
1860s -
70s Pennsylvania Molly Maguires; terrorist bombings in coal mines 
1890s-
1930s United States 
Various terrorist acts, e.g. Haymarket and Wall Street 
bombings, McKinley assassination, industrial sabotage 
1892 Wyoming "Cattle War" 
1930s United States "Shirt" movements; armed farmers block foreclosures 
1965-72 United States Vietnam era riots, sabotage, demonstrations 
1960s-
70s United States 
John Birch Minutemen; Posse Comitatus movement; Black 
Panthers; Weathermen; anti-Vietnam sabotage, arson, 
bombings 
1994 Oklahoma City Bombing of Federal office building 
CATEGORICAL UNCERTAINTIES  
Wherever the current wave of unofficial militias should be properly placed, either overall, 
or each one unto itself on a matrix derived from that or a more exhaustive list is difficult 
to say at this point, since it is not clear how many units and members there are, let alone 
the degree of coordination and activity. While differences in the ideology and focus of 
concern have been visible beyond the apparent common thread of anti-centralism, there is 
no way to tell how much they are a cyber-age phenomenon rather than a substantive 
coherent paramilitary insurgent movement. In 1974, awareness of the fact that a web-
page was only a web-page and might not represent anything substantive or factual was 
not as widely appreciated as it became soon afterward. Nor was the extent to which 
software typography and design features gave a certain graphic authority to irate and 
quirky elements of a type previously limited in credibility to their access to legitimating 
formats. Uncertainty regarding those and other aspects does not warrant discounting 
something that both proponents and critics have defined as dissident and a potential threat 
to public order, for while it is not easy to define the myriad differences between the 
current setting and the colonial and early national eras, they obviously outweigh 
similarities. Aside from Maryland in the mid-1700s and New York during Leisler's 
Rebellion, religious fervor was a more muted theme in colonial and early national 
dissidence. Variations in military technology and weaponry are also vast and complex, 
and complicate if not confound any attempt to draw common definitions of matters like 
bearing arms, let alone drawing analogies. Nor is it easy to tease critical variables and 
parallels out of all that, or plot current unofficial militias on a spectrum of American 
alienates and dissidents. A designer of any continuum or matrix, let alone a variable 
equation, would face a host of possibly significant elements and characteristics, such as 
symbolic/demonstrative, active but non-violent, episodically violent, and so on, as well as 
variants in the focus of resentments and/or demands. Pauline Maier pointed to that 
intricacy when she noted that in eighteenth-century active dissidence:18  
Not all eighteenth-century mobs simply defied the law; some used extralegal means to 
implement official demands or to enforce laws not otherwise enforceable . . . [or] 
extended the law in urgent situations beyond its technical limits. 
HISTORICAL ALLUSIONS AND LEGITIMAZATION  
As academic or irrelevant as the question of precedents, patterns and parallels may seem 
at first glance, historical allusions and justifications lace the rhetoric of advocates of the 
current wave of unofficial militias and their critics alike, especially interpretations of the 
United States and state constitutions and laws. Claims of legitimacy and precedents for 
forming private armed bands are drawn from selected portions of the US Constitution, 
especially the Second and Tenth Amendments. Despite their opponents' assertion that the 
Second Amendment was "never intended to protect the formation of private armies,"19 
the unofficial militia enthusiasts echo claims laid by seventeenth-century English Radical 
Whigs and some of the Founding Fathers that citizens-in-arms serve as a check-and-
balance against tyranny, and a salutary way to "to threaten government."20 That point of 
view is caught in essence by Jerry Cooper's assertion that:21  
The colonial view of military affairs demonstrated a suspicion of central authority, a 
preference for local control of military forces, a strong predilection for voluntary over 
compulsory service, and an open distaste for military professionalism. 
and in what Charles Royster called "a widespread intuitive suspicion of governmental 
power of all kinds."22 This debate is complicated by the Second Amendment's vague 
language, which has generated sharp differences over how much it was aimed at properly 
establishing a militia rather than protecting the right of individuals to own firearms, a 
paradox born of another paradox. While that was taken for granted in 1787,23 and guns 
were widely used for hunting, and for individual and organized defense along the 
frontier, many colonists could not afford them. Some of the Constitution's drafters, 
including Madison, saw such vagueness and the omission of difficult issues from the 
Constitutions as products of compromise, ambiguities and details that would be dealt 
with later more specifically by Congress and by state legislatures. Their expectations 
were realized over the next two centuries in respect to militia affairs, as many states 
passed laws forbidding "private armies," and court decisions, and such federal laws as the 
Dick Act of 1903 reshaped the militia until it evolved into the National Guard, mainly 
controlled and funded by federal authorities.  
MILITIA MEMBERSHIP  
It would, of course, have been surprising if many unofficial militias that cropped up 
frequently during the first two centuries of American history did not include many 
militiamen, since most adult males between 18 to 45 in the colonies and in the states of 
the early Republic were enrolled. Unfortunately, the intricate structure of those forces are 
somewhat out of focus in the current arguments, especially the diversity and 
contradictions noted by such scholars of those institutions as John Shy, Lawrence Cress 
and Richard Kohn.24 In the current discussions, we find little sense that militia units 
raised in British North America were much like those created in Great Britain and its 
other imperial possessions, including India, whose lineage some have traced to the 
medieval fyrd, William the Conqueror's Assize of Arms, and/or Tudor-Stuart train bands. 
Like the militia in Great Britain and Ireland, American variants were all at once regional 
security forces, social organizations, constabulary, and, most importantly, a manpower 
pool for large-scale mobilization. After the initial interlude of pacific relations with the 
Indians ended in 1622, local defense became increasingly crucial. Up to the 1670s, when 
the first small detachments of British regulars arrived, militia companies provided 
immediate defense.25 Militias varied in texture and quality from region to region in other 
ways,26 but, in general, most adult males in each colony were required to maintain 
personal arms and equipment, respond to musters and deploy in emergencies. In New 
Jersey, for example, fines were levied for shortages noted by sergeants in quarterly 
surveys.27 Militia membership and rank structure reflected the colonial social hierarchy. 
Although junior officers and NCOs at lower levels were often elected during 
mobilizations, those in the upper echelons received commissions from colonial 
governors, and substantial private wealth was required to hold high rank, especially when 
regiments were formed. As John Mahon pointed out, organized militia units during the 
colonial era were "no cross-section of the citizenry."28 In some cases, as in modern 
Switzerland, individuals were required to take commissions if deemed "officer material" 
and could not resign without authorization, 29 while eligibility and liability for militia 
service varied from colony to colony. British militia law restricted membership to 
Protestants,30 and in New England, many militia rolls were based on the dominant 
congregation's roster. Slaves, indentured servants, judges, transported convicts, 
clergymen, university faculty or students might be excluded or exempted in a particular 
colony, as well as newcomers and slaves.31 Although some of the latter were armed as 
militiamen, as in West Indian colonies, more often they were used, as were some 
freedmen, as porters and laborers when the militia mobilized. In the South, from the 
colonial period until the American Civil War, militias overlapped with slave patrols to 
intimidate and subjugate blacks, and quash rebellions,32 and during mobilizations, about 
a quarter of the white population was exempted to serve as overseers and slave patrol 
members.  
In the late 1600s, the colonies' involvement in military operations increased, episodically 
and regionally, as the frontier advanced. After the Stuart dynasty was deposed in the 
"Glorious Revolution" of 1688, and the "understanding" between the British and French 
monarchies ended, almost 80 years of wars and simmering conflict ensued, during which 
most colonists lived in some fear of sudden raids, attacks or invasion.33 Even before that, 
however, tensions over jurisdiction and support of militias had erupted within and 
between some colonies, and between various colonies and the Crown. The premium on 
militia readiness led to the creation of "minute companies" of younger militiamen, more 
frequently and intensively trained than the general militia, and able to quickly form and 
respond to emergencies, raids or invasions. War and the expectation of it also increased 
the burden on colonial governments of enrolling, administering and equipping militia 
units, which grew in scale and complexity throughout the eighteenth century, as the 
growing colonies were converted to provinces under Royal governors, and advances in 
military and naval professionalism in Europe changed the nature of warfare and brought 
about varying degrees of standardization of organized militia units' organization and 
equipment. While colonial forces -- more often in the form of provincial troops than 
militia units -- sometimes joined British forces on active service, and colonies 
occasionally mounted their own military expeditions, several major operations were 
aborted when British forces failed to arrive, despite plans and promises. Others were 
confounded by storms or defeat. By the mid-1700s, the Crown began to recruit provincial 
units in the colonies, as standing forces as well as for campaigns in North America and 
the Caribbean, including the 60th Royal Americans and Roger's Rangers, regiments that 
were trained, equipped and controlled by the British Army. That produced another 
paradox, as both the colonial wars and the advancing frontier reinforced the powers of 
local authority and responsibility for defense at the same time that many colonists left 
home and gained a new and more cosmopolitan view of the world.  
DEBATES ON MILITIA EFFECTIVENESS  
The uneven military performance of militiamen in the colonial wars and afterward fed 
debates over their military effectiveness versus that of Regulars. By the eve of the 
American Revolution, as Fred Anderson suggested, the militia system in general was "a 
problematic military tool . . . which could be used only briefly, in extreme emergencies . . 
. an all-purpose military infrastructure" whose "most important military function was to 
provide volunteers -- or if necessary, conscripts -- for the provincial armies."34 In 
counterpoint to that evolutionary progression were the unofficial militias that appeared in 
different forms and degrees during Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia in 1675, and in Leisler's 
Rebellion in New York,1688-89. Those upheavals, along with the Regulators in the 
Carolinas in 1741,35 and other outbreaks of mob violence and insurgency, were later 
deemed precursors of the Revolution, although historians are not of one mind on the 
subject.36 The rebel forces that gathered around Boston at the outset of the rebellion 
showed rather more diversity than unity of standardization in the variety of militia 
training, equipage, discipline and leadership. Although some units, especially the 
Pennsylvania and Virginia rifle companies, were of very high quality, the central role of 
campaigning was assumed over time by units of the Continental Army, which became 
something akin to Mao Ze Dong's vision of a fish swimming in the proverbial sea of the 
people, or, more specifically, the diffuse but pervasive network of the the militia. In yet 
another paradox, the regional forces worked both for and against the purposes of the 
Continentals. On the credit side, they performed a function akin to Russian military 
districts, or what John Shy called "a hybrid of a draft board and a modern reserve unit," 
which served as a conduit for disseminating revolutionary ideology, and a "virtually 
inexhaustible reservoir of rebel military manpower."37 While militiamen in combat 
sometimes played a key role in winning victories, most notably at Saratoga and 
Cowpens,38 on the debit side of the ledger were their diversity, which bedeviled 
Washington, their high enlistment bounties, which worked against recruiting Regulars, 
and enlistment terms, which sometimes excluded militiamen from serving beyond state 
boundaries and deprived the Continentals of manpower. Unhappy experiences with 
militia led General Nathanael Greene, who had used cadres of Continentals and local 
militia contingents in his southern campaign, to exclaim "from which the Good Lord 
deliver us."39 Their uneven performance frustrated Washington as much as it had British 
general James Wolfe barely a quarter century earlier, and led some to doubt the utility 
value of the militia, whatever its value as a counterpoise to standing forces. On the other 
hand, many New Englanders during the Revolution had fresh memories of British Army 
redcoats quartered in private homes and enforcing the "intolerable" writ of the Crown, 
which reinforced the Radical Whig view that Regulars of any stripe were instruments of 
tyranny.  
There was, then, a division of opinion, with even so ardent a rebel as Samuel Adams 
calling for "a permanent and well-appointed Army," while Benjamin Rush echoed the 
dissident rhetoric of the English Civil War and Radical Whigs in expressing his hope that 
the militia would be the mainstay of Congress' military forces, and that he would "despair 
of our cause if our country contained 60,000 men abandoned enough to enlist for three 
years or during [for the duration of] the war."40 The citizen-soldier ideal continued to 
thrive despite defeats, and the parochialism and local politics that continued to hamper 
militia military discipline and professionalism. Another persistent problem was the fact 
that when militia units suffered heavy losses, it decimated their locale's male population. 
While that was serious enough in Europe, in America, it left a unit's home region 
undefended, and crippled its agriculture and commerce -- a dilemma that had been 
buffered by using provincial forces in the colonial period. In addition to inadequate 
training, and fear of well-disciplined and brutal Regulars, that helps to explain why 
militiamen often failed to rally, fled or deserted. The general pattern of the Revolution 
roughly paralleled that of the English Civil War, in the first phase of which the 
Parliamentary army that had been formed around "train bands" of middle-class citizens-
in-arms from London and East Anglia was defeated by Charles I's army, originally raised 
despite Parliament's attempts to deprive him of taxes. The "Roundheads" then gained the 
initiative by reforming their forces, and creating a formidable standing army, the "New 
Model," which put another tyrant in power. That contradiction, and the very unpleasant 
Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, a prototypical modern dictatorship, were left out of 
focus when Whigs hailed that evolutionary product of citizens-in-arms as the nemesis of 
monarchical power, and are today as well.  
HOSTILITY TOWARD STANDING FORCES  
That was, of course, not the only historical instance which politically active Americans 
had in view during the Revolution and early National period. Many were educated or 
self-educated, and knew something of classical history, including the rivalry of 
"democratic" Athens and its militia-based forces with the garrison state of Sparta, and 
Marius' reforms, which undermined the Roman Republic by replacing the militia with a 
standing army.41 While Edward Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
published in 1776, offered a fresh view of that, and Machiavelli urged Florentines to 
found a democracy around a people's militia, and throw off the mercenary condottieri, 
more powerful influences were Justice Blackstone's protest against a standing army in his 
Commentaries,42 and such political pamphlets as John Trenchard's A Standing Army is 
Inconsistent With a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive of the English 
Monarchy (1697).43 Closer at hand in the flow of history were, aside from the New 
Model Army, the excesses of the Thirty Years' War, Prussia's garrison state, the Jacobite 
levies, and British provocations that led to the American Revolution, most notably the 
Quartering Act, and British Regulars' coercing of Bostonians. In any case, in 1787, some 
delegates urged that the new constitution outlaw a standing army as some states had done 
under the Continental Congress and during the period of the Articles of Confederation. 
Disagreement over the phrase "a well-regulated militia" in the Constitution's Second 
Amendment in the 1790s was only one of many differences among American elites after 
the Revolution, in a world which, as Disraeli later said, was "for the few and the very 
few." The Constitution's framers also debated military organization and the military 
effectiveness of militia forces. While some opposed creating standing armed forces, or 
saw a militia-based defense as a "cheap buy" for the new, small nation, or the only 
feasible course given the limited resources, such senior Revolutionary War leaders as 
Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, Baron von Steuben and Henry Knox, were less 
than enthusiastic about the militia.44 Drawing on their experiences in that conflict, they 
devised roughly similar models, each based on a small core of standing armies 
supplemented by tiers of militia forces, whose quality and readiness decreased with size, 
and all under the authority of a central government. Nor was their full agreement on the 
definition of militia. While Thomas Jefferson, who lacked personal military experience, 
defined it, as many others did at the time, and some do today as all adult males (and by 
implication and in some of the states, free adult white males) able to serve if required.45 
Baron Von Steuben, the trainer of the Continental Army, in dismissing that suggested 
that "It would be as sensible and consistent to say every Citizen should be a sailor,"46 
and expressed a view also shared by many others of the militia being those members of 
the Unorganized Militia -- the pool of eligibles -- who were armed, equipped and enrolled 
in organized, disciplined units, which trained frequently and were able to mobilize 
quickly.  
INSURGENCY AND FEDERALIZATION  
Those issues had been overshadowed in 1786 as disturbances erupted in North Carolina, 
where the rump state of Franklin was formed, and in western Pennsylvania, Kentucky 
and Virginia. Most critically, in Massachusetts, armed bands of farmers and small 
businessmen angered by foreclosures and bankruptcies, and claiming the status of 
militias, began to intimidate courts and legislatures. Since the Confederation's tiny 
standing army of 900 men was scattered throughout the states, mainly as caretakers of 
stands of arms, arsenals and fortifications, the central government's inability to aid 
threatened states' militias led many observers to fear a general insurrection as insurgency 
intensified. Most of the insurgents were, like much of the adult male population in 
general, members of the organized state militias, or veterans of them, and/or the 
Continental Army. The uprising, initially deemed the New England Regulation, soon 
became popularly known as Shays' Rebellion, named for the militia captain whom the 
insurgents chose for their leader.47  
Washington, long concerned by the weak common defense, feared that the unofficial 
militias portended a more general upheaval, in contrast with Jefferson, away in Paris, 
who saw them as in keeping with his hopes for periodic revolutions whose blood would 
nourish the roots of the tree of liberty. Many shared that view at a time when mob action 
had been enshrined in both radical politics in Britain and American patriotic symbolism, 
and was more common and not yet fully delimited by law -- the French Reign of Terror 
and the creation of police forces lay in the future.48 Jefferson's zeal soon gave way to 
alarm, however, as the Massachusetts outbreaks intensified, and an inflammatory letter 
over Shays' signature (later proved a forgery) made them seem to be a well-organized 
conspiracy. As such gatherings grew to well over a thousand armed men, the insurgents' 
list of demands further alarmed men of property and especially creditors in calling for a 
remission of all debts, issuance of paper money, and common ownership of all property 
won by common effort during the Revolution.  
As local officials floundered and vacillated, General Henry Knox, a Revolutionary War 
general and the Secretary of War in the Articles of Confederation government, sought to 
juggle with both his own conflicting options and theirs. Although he agreed with 
Massachusetts legislators that only regional militias should be deployed against the 
insurgents, since using central government forces might be seen as inflammatory, and 
wanted to safeguard the central government's arsenals, especially the one at Springfield 
that was most threatened by Shays' followers, he nevertheless denied local militiamen 
access to arms. In another oblique move against the insurgents, in October, the 
Confederation Congress increased its standing forces by 1,340 men, officially raised to 
fight Indians in Ohio. Those soon joined forces, however, with reliable units of New 
England militiamen from higher tiers of society whom Knox described as "men of 
respectable character and great property as compared with their opponents."49 In late 
January 1787, the Shaysian insurgents were routed at Springfield by cannon fire with 
light losses. Although several of their leaders were sentenced to death, including the 
fugitive Shays, they later received amnesty, and the Massachusetts legislature ultimately 
reviewed their grievances.  
Even after the Constitutional Convention was called, many feared further waves of 
insurgency, or battles between state forces,50 but those apprehensions eased as the 
delegates struggled to balance centralism and regionalism in respect to many issues. In 
the realm of national defense and militia affairs, they named the President as commander-
in-chief of the "Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual service of the United States . . . "51 and gave Congress 
power to raise and support armies, write rules and regulations for their governance, and to 
"provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrection, and repel Invasions" and "for organizing, arming and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the service of the 
United States."52 Clearer boundaries were drawn in the Militia Act and Calling Forth 
Acts of 1792, which defined militia as "citizens of the respective states . . . organized as 
the legislature of each state shall direct."53 Able-bodied males, 18-45, were to stand 
ready to respond with specified personal military weapons and equipment, and 
procedures were established for a President's calling out the militia. Each State was to 
have an Adjutant General, and an Inspector of troops who would prescribe organization 
and training, and authorize the forming of companies.  
UNOFFICIAL MILITIAS FOR AND AGAINST THE REPUBLIC  
Unofficial militias continued to appear, however, and the new government's will and 
strength were tested two years later in western Pennsylvania when some 13,000 angry 
farmers and supporters who opposed the Federal tax on whisky produced from surplus 
crops claimed the status of militias, and began marching through towns to defy the 
excise. An array of about 12,000 Regulars, and militiamen from several nearby states, 
dispersed them, and a year later, another Militia Act increased Presidential call-up 
powers, and authorized using militia to enforce federal laws against reluctant states. 
Throughout the first half of the next century, however, state and federal funding of the 
militia slowly declined, and the colorful populism of annual muster and attendant 
carousing passed into history. Despite that, until well after the War of 1812, many 
Americans still saw militias as a check to the tyrannical threat of a standing army and 
centralized government, even though Congress and the courts continually tightened 
federal control over state forces. Despite that broad trend, unofficial militias continued to 
appear, and not always insurgent in nature. Literally hundreds of social paramilitary 
companies and regiments were formed from the 1820s to the Civil War, many of them 
along the lines of such socially elite militia units as Boston's Ancient and Honourable 
Artillery Company, formed in 1638, and others created from the mid-1740s on, which 
George Washington, when he commanded the Continental Army, saw as a drain on the 
general militia, and a source of bewildering variations in training, administration and 
leadership quality.54 From the War of 1812 to the Civil War, the benign unofficial 
militias became a fad in America, as they formed "independently of the statewide 
system" for social purposes, generally under state militia laws,55 and receiving no 
government funds. Members were those who could afford distinctive, elegant uniforms 
and equipage, and prominent citizens were usually elected as senior officers, although 
some were formed by mechanics, artisans and various ethnic groups.56 While election of 
state militia officers continued until the early twentieth century, and informal screening 
into the latter half of the twentieth century, as Jerry Cooper noted, the elitism of 
"antebellum uniformed companies" was the antithesis of the citizen-soldier ideal, and far 
from the Revolutionary view of militia as the people-in-arms.57 Yet they did resemble 
the old militia in becoming a center of local community life and politics, and such 
activities as parades, balls and public ceremonies.  
Although many of those unofficial militia units were short-lived, some aided militiamen 
and federal troops in emergencies, or supported watchmen and the small police forces 
that began to appear before the Civil War, as well as aiding federal marshals when they 
formed a posse comitatus to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, and sometimes playing a 
crucial constabulary role.58 The aid to federal forces was justified by the "Cushing 
Doctrine," coined by President Franklin Pierce's Attorney General, Caleb Cushing, who 
held that all citizens, military or civilian, were bound to support federal officers if 
required.59 While about 25,000 men were enrolled in actual militias in 1804, mainly in 
bigger cities, there were literally thousands of the social, unofficial militia companies 
throughout the nation when the Civil War began, as well as roughly two million state 
militiamen in all categories, North and South, most of them enrolled but not serving in 
organized units. Despite the wide range in military quality, and what Marcus Cunliffe 
deemed "a thread of make-believe running through the whole affair," many of the social 
unofficial militias evolved into Volunteer regiments in the Civil War.60  
On the other side of the coin, a number of insurgent unofficial militias resembled those 
that had appeared in Shays', the Whiskey, and Fries's Rebellions in their inclusion of 
active or former militiamen, or veterans of active service. That was the case in the 
Hunters' Lodges affair in upper New York in the late 1830s, and during the 1850s, in the 
Mormon War, California vigilantism, and "Bleeding Kansas." After the Civil War, during 
the Reconstruction era in the South, 1865-77, federally controlled militias and Southern 
unofficial militias were engaged in a bitter struggle. Initially, with the old white Southern 
militias outlawed, federal troops and black militias served as constabulary, but as the 
ranks of the former were steadily reduced, military governors relied on black militiamen 
for local security, supported by flying squads of Regular cavalry. Local armed bands 
appeared, first in Tennessee, then across the South, some of them night riders, wearing 
the ghostly garb of the slave patrols, and sporting such florid titles as the Ku Klux Klan 
and Knights of the White Camellia, while others, like the Red Shirts in Alabama, were 
overtly paramilitary, drilling in public, all in essence resurrecting the old slave patrol. As 
an official historian concluded a century later:61  
the tactics, covert and overt, of the secret societies and the rifle clubs eventually 
triumphed in 1877, and when the troops were removed, white supremacy had been 
restored to the South. 
POST-BELLUM DEVELOPMENTS  
As federal forces withdrew after the Compromise of 1877, the militias' status in the 
United States, North and South, was dramatically altered by the Posse Comitatus Act,62 
which forbade Regular military forces troops from policing civilians except in extreme 
circumstances. The shunting of the constabulary role toward the militia created a chasm 
between workers and citizen-soldiers over the next two generations, mainly in the North 
and West, and in the South, between the white populace and troops confronting lynch 
mobs.63 The Posse Comitatus Act also left federal authorities in remote areas of the West 
without forces to deal with small private armies, some of whom claimed the status of 
militia, most dramatically in the Lincoln County War of 1878 in New Mexico, a 
quandary not addressed directly until a federal marshal force was created to deal with 
civil rights related disturbances in the mid-twentieth century.64 At the same time, 
throughout the late nineteenth century, the old people-in-arms concept was not only 
eroded by the growing emphasis on constabulary service, and the increasing use of the 
French revolutionary term "National Guard" in lieu of "militia," but by advances in 
military technology and professionalism, which led Regular Army officers to attempt to 
impose their standards on militia/National Guard units. Some militia officers and state 
governments cooperated, but others resisted. After the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-71, 
in which the Prussian General Staff raised and deployed large armies of reservists and 
conscripts by using a web of railways and telegraph lines, Germany scored another 
victory as many nations agreed to outlaw civilians-in-arms, and label them franc-tireurs 
after the French snipers that harried German troops in 1871. At the end of the century, 
however, Germans and others cheered when Boer commandos, mounted citizen 
marksmen, harried the British Army in South Africa 1899-1901. Despite the proscription 
of franc-tireurs, visions of defense-in-depth and the harrying of invading armies by 
citizen sharpshooters became a popular idea in the late 1800s as mass-production and 
marketing of weapons and ammunition fed a boom in recreational shooting, especially in 
Britain and the United States. At the same time, court decisions began to construe the 
Second Amendment in favor of justifying the personal ownership of guns. Despite the 
enthusiasm for civilian marksmanship, growing costs and complexity were putting more 
and more of the arsenal out of the reach of private citizens financially and technically, 
and at the end of the 1800s, an American Regular Army officer judged militia forces as 
"almost valueless in a strictly military point of view."65  
THE MILITIA BECOMES THE NATIONAL GUARD  
In 1903, the US Congress passed the Dick Act, which defined the National Guard's "role 
in the entire national defense structure . . . in law what it had been in fact, namely," as 
"the military reserve of the Army."66 When the US entered World War I, few traces were 
left of the old concept of the militia being a populist counterpoise to the smaller Regular 
forces of the central government. The National Guard's constabulary role was thrown into 
relief when many of its units were called up for service on the Mexican border in 1916, 
and then for World War in 1917. Concerns over sabotage and disorder led to the forming 
of State Guard forces, about 80,000 in all, as well as the creation of a federally-formed 
United States Guard of almost 30,000.67 That caused bristling in some quarters, as it did 
again when such forces were re-formed in some states on the eve of World War II.68  
UNCERTAIN LINES OF CONTINUITY  
In looking back at that broadly-limned pattern, it is hard to trace lines of historical 
continuity between the various stages of militia/National Guard evolution, let alone trace 
the precise roots of the recent appearance of unofficial militias as a whole, still less those 
of each of the estimated 400-some separate units. The Constitution's provision that "No 
State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in times of 
peace . . . "69 does not on the surface of it seem to provide small groups and individual 
citizens with a greater right to wield military power than the states themselves.70 But 
neither is it clear at what point forming armed bands conforms with or diverges from 
rights of assembly and free expression, or where the boundary lies between brandishing 
weapons and disorderly conduct, let alone insurrection. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 
Madison's and Wilson's times showed how defining treason and insurgency in itself could 
have a powerful catalytic effect, while Shays' Rebellion showed that time's passing and 
cooling tempers can resolve tense situations. Do the current unofficial militias in general 
fit into a continuum or matrix with other dissidents in American history? The wide range 
of ideologies and resentments that drove various unofficial militias is confusing enough, 
and blurs our sense of whether such occasional eruptions are symptoms of some sort of 
syndrome that have appeared from time to time, the emergence of long waves of chronic 
frustration and friction in a culture in which the image of guns in the hands of citizens has 
long had a special iconic power, positive and negative. Where do we fit such apparent 
anomalies as uniformed bands that struck paramilitary postures but did not bear arms 
openly like the German-American Bund, and fascistoid "Shirt" movements from the 
1930s to 1950s, and the more recent Islam Brotherhood, those who were armed but not 
paramilitary, such as the gaggles of angry armed farmers that blocked foreclosures in the 
Great Depression, and the Black Panthers of the 1960s? What of those who bore arms 
violently but in secret, like the Mafia and the Ku Klux Klan? Do common threads beyond 
mimicry actually run through the Regulators, 1930s paramilitary extremist groups,71 the 
"Minutemen" linked to the John Birch Society in the late 1950s and early 1960s, or the 
Posse Comitatus movement of the 1970s? Or was each one sui generis? Has the Internet 
allowed an easy amalgamation of those who fear modernization, gun control,72 secrecy 
in government, the proliferation of federal police agencies, and the increasing 
intrusiveness of government?73 What of such diverse factors as paint-gun and enactment 
groups, mass-marketed military gear, the resurgence of religious fervor and intolerance, 
the international resurgence of neo-Fascism, long-standing American impulses toward 
secession, or chronic alienation? Although such searching for patterns sounds like 
academic speculation, there is no shortage of practical implications. For example, who, 
either in the near or distant future, might choose to form armed groups on the basis of all 
those precedents, including the current ones, but with more coherence, skill and purpose.  
CONCLUSION  
Over what is now nearly four centuries of American history -- when that is defined as 
what evolved from the settlements at Jamestown and Massachusetts Bay -- legal and 
unofficial militias have been dealt with reactively and episodically, both in the realm of 
practical political affairs and by historians. Some may take comfort from the fact that 
nearly all of the many dissident groups of varying hues had little impact and faded away, 
but the scale and effect of the major exceptions -- the militias' role as a social matrix and 
ideological conduit in the Revolution, the deceptively bland pre-Civil War social quasi-
militias that flowed into the burgeoning armies, and the terrorist Klan -- do not present a 
consistent or comforting pattern. Nor is it easy to create an analytical matrix that 
encompasses such disparate specimens as the slave patrols, the anti-rent movement, cattle 
wars, and Vietnam era terrorists, let alone the Know Nothings, the Jewish Defense 
League, the Black Panthers and the Christian Identity movement. Treating them as beads 
on a long string of curiosities may seem to be the higher wisdom, since the overall 
phenomenon of chronic dissidence in American history might be used to either attack and 
defend the model of exceptionalism. Not only does the sheer complexity of the 
phenomenology of dissidence in all its forms, including the unofficial militias, confound 
analysis and the tracing of causality, but also puts prevention, diagnosis and cure in 
abeyance, and the question of whether that is beyond our grasp in any case. If we were 
certain of being able to work the diversity of purpose and motive of unofficial militias 
and insurgent groups into meaningful patterns beyond some Brownian model of random 
collisions, the central question to examine would be the larger significance of their 
recurrence, and whether it has been a symptom of chronic social and political pathology. 
If such groups have for the most part been, as Richard Hofstadter averred, a kind of low 
order infection controlled by the auto-immune system of a great democracy, that is one 
thing. But there is no guarantee of that, nor certainty whether any specific recurrence 
would be proportional to the vast majority of precedents, or to those very few which were 
of great magnitude and consequence.  
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